{"id":4,"date":"2007-08-20T20:57:33","date_gmt":"2007-08-21T03:57:33","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/brookschoenfield.com\/?p=4"},"modified":"2007-08-20T20:59:24","modified_gmt":"2007-08-21T03:59:24","slug":"the-sans-application-security-summit","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/brookschoenfield.com\/?p=4","title":{"rendered":"The SANS Application Security Summit"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Two days, about 20 speakers, all the major tool makers, pundits, researchers, penetration testers, this <a href=\"http:\/\/www.sans.org\/appsummit07\/\" title=\"summit\" target=\"_blank\">summit<\/a> was almost a who\u2019s who of application security. <a href=\"http:\/\/www.sans.org\" title=\"SANS\">SANS<\/a> wanted to kick-off their new <a href=\"http:\/\/www.giac.org\/\" target=\"_blank\">GIAC<\/a> application coding certification.  And, along with that, they wanted to take a pulse of the industry. I was privileged to be included on a couple of panels &#8211; there were frighteningly smart people speaking &#8211; country mouse playing with the city cats, definitely!<\/p>\n<p>A couple of my colleagues sat for the exam. I once held GIAC Intrusion Detection certification (#104?) but I let it lapse. (It\u2019s not really relevant to what I do now) My buddies said it was a reasonable exam.  The exam covered implementing security controls from the language APIs (java &#8211; JAAS calls) and coding securely.<\/p>\n<p>The larger issue is what can we make out of this certification? How much effect will it have? Will getting coders certified change the landscape significantly?<\/p>\n<p>There was plenty of FUD from the toolmakers. Yes, the entire web is vulnerable, apparently. Ugh! You probably knew that already, huh?<\/p>\n<p>The numbers of applications out there is staggering. Estimates were running in the 100 millions. That\u2019s a lot of vulnerable code. And, considering that my work\u2019s DMZ takes a 6 million attack pounding every 24 hours, it\u2019s not too far a stretch to assume that at least a few of those attacks are getting through. We only know about the incidents that are reported or that cause damage (as pointed out in the Cenzic report released at the Summit)<\/p>\n<p>And, it seems like the financial incentives for exploiting vulnerabilities are <a href=\"http:\/\/news.bbc.co.uk\/1\/hi\/technology\/6511927.stm\" target=\"_blank\">maturing<\/a>? (a google search will reveal dozens of financially motivated hack reports) If so, cash incentives will likely increase the number of incidents for all of us. Another big sigh.<\/p>\n<p>One of the most interesting speakers to me at the conference was Dinis Cruz, CTO of Ounce Labs. A couple of times, he pointed out that while yes, we are being hacked, there\u2019s no blood on the floor. Nobody\u2019s been killed from a web hack (thank goodness!) We (inductries that use the web heavily) are losing money doing damage control, making up losses (especially, the financial industry), and doing remediations. Absolutely true.<\/p>\n<p>But has anyone done an analysis of what the risk picture looks like? Is web exposure worth it? Are we making more than we\u2019re losing? So much more that, like actuaries, the risks are worth it?<\/p>\n<p>I know this question may seem crazy for someone from inside the information security industry to ask? But, anyone who knows me, knows that I like to ask the questions that aren\u2019t being asked, that perhaps might even be taboo? We security folk often focus on reducing risk until we feel comfortable.  That &#8220;warm and fuzzy&#8221;. Risk is \u201cbad\u201d, and must be reduced. Well, yeah. I fall into that trap all too often, myself.<\/p>\n<p>It\u2019s important when assessing a system to bring its risk down to the \u201cusual and acceptable\u201d levels of practice and custom of one\u2019s organization. That\u2019s at least part of my daily job.<\/p>\n<p>But appropriate business risk always includes space for losses. What\u2019s the ratio? Dinis definitely set me to considering the larger picture.<\/p>\n<p>My work organization takes in more than 90% of its revenue through web sites. As long as loss is within tolerable limits, we should be ok, right? The problem with this statement comes with a few special classes of data compromise. These can\u2019t be ignored quite so easily (or, the risk picture needs to be calculated more wholistically)<\/p>\n<p>\u2022 Privacy laws are getting tougher. How does one actually inform each of 38 States Attorneys-General first? And, the Japan law makes this problem seem trivial.<br \/>\n\u2022 Privacy breaches are really hard on customer goodwill. Ahem<br \/>\n\u2022 Internet savvy folks are afraid of identity theft (again, a personally identifying information (PII) issue). The aftermath from identity theft can last for years and go way beyond the $50 credit card loss limit that makes consumer web commerce run.<\/p>\n<p>I\u2019ve got friends working for other companies that are dealing with the fall-out from these sorts of breaches. It ain\u2019t pretty. It\u2019s bad for organizations. The fall-out sometimes dwarfs the asset losses.<\/p>\n<p>And, if I think about it, about all the vulnerabilities out there, are we each just one SQL injection exposure away from the same? Forget the laptop on the car seat. PII is sitting on organization database servers that are being queried by vulnerable web applications.<\/p>\n<p>Considering this possibility brings me back to the importance of application security. Yes, I think we have to keep working on it.<\/p>\n<p>And, our tool set is immature. As I see it, the industry is highly dependent upon people like Dinis Cruz to review our code and to analyze our running applications. I don\u2019t think Dinis is a cheap date!<\/p>\n<p>So, what to do?<\/p>\n<p>I\u2019ll offer what John Chambers, CEO of Cisco Systems, Inc., told me. (no, I don\u2019t know him. I happened be in the same room and happened to have him take my question and answer it. Serendipitous circumstances). \u201cThink architecturally\u201d<\/p>\n<p>That is, I don\u2019t think we\u2019re going to train and hire our way out of the vulnerability debt that we\u2019ve dug for ourselves with 100 million apps on the web being vulnerable. Ahem. That\u2019d take a lot of analysis. And, at the usual cost of $300\/hour, who\u2019d have the resources?<\/p>\n<p>I\u2019ll offer that we have to stop talking about and to ourselves about the problem and get it in front of all the stake holders. Who are those?<\/p>\n<p>\u2022 The risk holders (i.e., executive management)<br \/>\n\u2022 Our developer communities (SANS certification is certainly a start. But I think that security has to be taught as a typical part of proper defensive programming. Just like structuring code or handling exceptions, input must be validated.)<br \/>\n\u2022 Security as an aspect of system design and architecture. Not that cute box along the side labeled \u201csecurity\u201d in the logical architecture diagram. Rather, we need to treat each security control as components of the system, just like the other logical functions.<\/p>\n<p>Which brings me back to the SANS Summit.<\/p>\n<p>My sense of this summit is that we haven\u2019t yet reached the tipping point. I didn\u2019t speak to everyone there. But I spoke to a fair share (I won\u2019t call it a sample. My conversations were hardly statistical in nature!)<\/p>\n<p>Most folks with which I chatted were like me, in the trenches. We had a few formidable notables in the room, and, of course, I think there were a few beginners, as well. My guess is that most branches of the industry were represented: tool makers, consultants, Information security folk, with a sprinkling of governmental folk thrown in. The folks that I spoke to understood the issues.<\/p>\n<p>If I could hazard a guess, the folks who made the time to come are the folks concerned and\/or charged with, or making money out of, application security. In other words, the industry. We were talking to ourselves.<\/p>\n<p>That\u2019s not necessarily a bad thing. I\u2019m guessing that most of us have been pretty lonely out there? There\u2019s validation and solidarity (leftists, please forgive me for using that term here &#8211; but it does fit!) when we get together. We network. We test our ideas and our programs. That\u2019s important. And, I heard a few really great ideas that were fresh to me.<\/p>\n<p>But I think we need to take this out a good deal further, to a \u201ctipping point\u201d if you will, in order to move the state-of-the-art. And, I don\u2019t think we\u2019re there yet. Consider, if you will, how many programmers are writing web code right now?<\/p>\n<p>What do you think?<\/p>\n<p>cheers<\/p>\n<p>\/brook<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Two days, about 20 speakers, all the major tool makers, pundits, researchers, penetration testers, this summit was almost a who\u2019s who of application security. SANS wanted to kick-off their new GIAC application coding certification. And, along with that, they wanted &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/brookschoenfield.com\/?p=4\">Continue reading <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"nf_dc_page":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[3,12,15,13,11,4],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-applications","category-conferences","category-information-security","category-papers","category-risk","category-web"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/brookschoenfield.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/brookschoenfield.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/brookschoenfield.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/brookschoenfield.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/brookschoenfield.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=4"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/brookschoenfield.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/brookschoenfield.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=4"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/brookschoenfield.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=4"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/brookschoenfield.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=4"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}